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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ___________ 
 
Weis, Circuit Judge. 
 This is a negligence suit growing out of a transfusion 
of contaminated blood collected by the Red Cross through its 
volunteer donor program.  After a bench trial, the district court 
entered judgment in favor of the Red Cross.  In this appeal, we 
hold that the Red Cross is not clothed with governmental immunity 
and therefore the plaintiff's request for a jury trial should 
have been granted.  Accordingly, the case must be remanded for a 
new trial.  We concur with the district court's determination 
  
that the donor of the blood may be required to testify, but under 
conditions that protect his anonymity.  
 Plaintiff, Carol Marcella, was infected with HIV as a 
result of a blood transfusion she received at Brandywine Hospital 
on February 5, 1985, in the course of emergency treatment for 
injuries sustained in an automobile accident.  Her condition has 
deteriorated to the point that it is inevitable she will soon 
develop full blown AIDS.  The blood had been donated through the 
Red Cross on January 29, 1985 by a homosexual male who was HIV+.  
He gave blood again on June 8, 1985.  At that time, the Red Cross 
performed an ELIZA test, which can determine whether a blood 
sample is contaminated by HIV.  That test did not receive 
approval from the Food and Drug Administration until March 1985 
and was not available at the time of Marcella's transfusion.  
Through a "look back" program, the Red Cross discovered that she 
had received infected blood. 
 The complaint filed in the Common Pleas Court of 
Chester County, Pennsylvania, on July 14, 1988 named as 
defendants the hospital, the physicians who had treated 
plaintiff, and the American Red Cross.  Plaintiff1 did not ask 
for a jury trial, but the doctors and the Brandywine Hospital did 
file such demands.    
 The case was removed to the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and the hospital 
                     
1
.  For simplicity's sake, we will refer only to Carol Marcella 
as plaintiff.  The suit was also filed on behalf of her husband 
and minor children.   
  
renewed its demand for a jury trial.  None of the other parties 
did so.  The case was docketed in the district court as a jury 
trial.  Shortly before the case was scheduled for trial, the Red 
Cross filed a motion "[t]o confirm that this was a nonjury 
trial."  Plaintiff opposed the motion on the basis that she was 
entitled to the benefit of the jury trial demand filed by the 
hospital and doctors in the state court.  
 The district court ordered that the negligence counts 
against the hospital (the claims against the doctors having been 
dismissed) would be tried to a jury, but that the plaintiff's 
claim against the Red Cross would be decided in a bench trial.  
The court then severed the claims and proceeded first on the one 
against the Red Cross.   
 Before trial, the plaintiff's request for a discovery 
deposition of the donor of the contaminated blood was denied, 
although he was required to answer interrogatories.  After 
proceeding for several days in the nonjury trial, the district 
judge arranged to take the testimony of the donor, under 
conditions that would assure his anonymity.   
 In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the 
court decided that the Red Cross' policy of ascertaining 
potential sources of contaminated blood by submitting 
questionnaires to voluntary donors was faulty.  The judge 
determined that the Red Cross was "properly chargeable with 
negligence for the unreasonable turgidity of its instructional 
materials" as well as for using outdated questionnaires when the 
donor first gave blood in January 1985.    
  
 However, because the donor again gave blood in June 
1985, despite the questionnaires having been clarified,2 the 
court decided that the negligence of the Red Cross was not a 
causative factor.  "Donor X would not have been prevented from 
giving blood on January 29, 1985, even if the defendant had 
dotted all the `i's' and crossed all the `t's.'"  Judgment was 
therefore entered for the Red Cross.  Subsequently, summary 
judgment was entered in favor of the hospital. 
 The plaintiff has appealed only the judgment in favor 
of the Red Cross asserting:  (1) that she was improperly denied 
the right to a jury trial; (2) that the court's analysis of the 
evidence was faulty; and (3) that some of the evidence about the 
donation on June 8, 1985 was inadmissible.3 
 I. 
 The evidence in this case would sustain the district 
court's finding that the Red Cross did not cause Marcella's harm.  
The judge, as factfinder, evaluated the demeanor, education and 
                     
2
.  Among other screening procedures, a brochure was given by the 
Red Cross to the donor in January 1985.  It did not contain the 
guidelines on exclusion of high-risk groups recommended by the 
Public Health Service in December 1984.  That guideline defined 
the high-risk group as homosexual and bi-sexual "[m]ales who have 
had sex with more than one male since 1979."  Instead, the Red 
Cross brochure described the high-risk group as "[s]exually 
active homosexual or bisexual men with multiple partners (more 
than one)."  However, the new guideline had been incorporated 
into the materials given to the donor when he again gave blood in 
June 1985. 
3
.  We have reviewed the plaintiff's contention that the 
admission of certain evidence was erroneous and conclude that it 
lacks merit. 
  
sophistication of the donor to determine that he would have 
persisted in giving blood even if the correct instruction had 
been given at the January donation.  The credibility evaluations 
of the donor were essential to the factual findings derived from 
his testimony.   
 However, a jury could properly make different 
credibility and causation determinations that would lead it to 
assess liability against The Red Cross.  Consequently, the record 
is not sufficient to establish the crucial facts as a matter of 
law and we would be compelled to reverse a directed verdict in a 
jury trial based on these facts.  See Amoco Oil Co. v. Torcomian, 
722 F.2d 1099, 1100-01 (3d Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Corry Jamestown 
Corp., 719 F.2d 1219, 1225 (3d Cir. 1983) (Denial of trial by 
jury is reversible error unless a directed verdict would have 
been appropriate).  Consequently, if the district court erred in 
denying the plaintiff a jury, the case must be remanded for a new 
trial.   
 II. 
 The preliminary question, therefore, is whether 
plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial.  The issue is not a simple 
one, and the district courts that have considered the point are 
divided in their rulings.4  No Court of Appeals has considered 
the point in a published opinion.   
                     
4
.  In the following published opinions, district courts have 
permitted jury trials against the Red Cross:  Doe v. American 
Nat'l Red Cross, 847 F. Supp. 643, 647 (W.D. Wis. 1994); Doe v. 
American Red Cross, 845 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.W.V. 1994) (Red Cross 
also subject to punitive damages).  Other opinions have denied 
the right to jury trials against the Red Cross:  Berman v. 
  
 The collection and distribution of human blood for 
medical purposes is a commercial operation on the part of the Red 
Cross and other entities that operate blood banks.  The nature of 
the enterprise and the identity of the supplier are matters to be 
considered in deciding whether an injured party has a right to a 
jury trial in a claim based on negligence.   
 The Red Cross contends that it is a federal 
instrumentality that shares governmental immunity to trial by 
jury.  It is clear that the federal government itself is not 
subject to trial by jury unless it specifically consents.  
Lehman, Sec'y of Navy v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160-61 (1981).  
The question here is whether, in this respect, the Red Cross is 
to be treated as part of the federal government.   
 The American Red Cross is a unique organization.  It 
was chartered by Congress as a federal corporation in 1905.  36 
U.S.C. § 1-15.  Its chief purpose at that time was to serve as 
(..continued) 
American Nat'l Red Cross, 834 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Ind. 1993);  
Johnson v. Hospital of Medical College of Pennsylvania, 826 F. 
Supp. 942 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Barton v. American Red Cross, 826 F. 
Supp. 412 (M.D. Ala. 1993), aff'd without op., 1994 U.S.App. 
Lexis 35582 (11th Cir. Dec. 16, 1994).  Barton was appealed after 
the district court granted summary judgment to the Red Cross.  
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit's summary affirmance did not reach the 
jury trial question.   
 
 Interestingly, all the cited cases arose after the 
Supreme Court's decision in American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 
S. Ct. 2465 (1992).  In Bentz v. American Red Cross, 932 F.2d 958 
(3d Cir. 1991), we summarily affirmed a jury verdict against the 
Red Cross.  The Red Cross never raised the immunity issue at 
either the trial or the appellate level. 
 
 
  
the agency in this country to monitor and implement the 
requirements of the Geneva Convention applicable to the care of 
the sick, wounded, and prisoners in time of war.  Later, the 
scope of its activity was expanded to include service to victims 
of natural disasters.   
 The national Red Cross is designed to work in 
conjunction with societies in other nations and with the 
International Red Cross.  Emphasizing that its prestige and 
usefulness is based on neutrality, the Chairman of the American 
Red Cross commented in 1946, "[t]o preserve this vital principle 
intact, the International Red Cross Committee has always 
maintained that the national societies, while cooperating closely 
and cordially with their own governments and with other agencies, 
should at the same time remain independent."  Hon. Basil 
O'Connor, Annual Report of the American National Red Cross 
Corporation for 1946, at 19, reprinted in Wesley A. Sturges, The 
Legal Status of the Red Cross, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 12  n.30 
(1957), cited in Irwin Mem. Blood Bank of the San Francisco 
Medical Soc'y v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 640 F.2d 1051, 1057 
(9th Cir. 1981). 
 Close cooperation with government is essential to the 
work of the Red Cross.  A perception that the organization is 
independent and neutral is equally vital.  The Red Cross charter 
provisions reflect an attempt to reconcile these objectives.    
 Some control by the federal government is demonstrated 
by a provision empowering the President of the United States to 
appoint eight of the fifty members of the Red Cross Board of 
  
Governors and to designate one of them to be its presiding 
officer.  36 U.S.C. § 5.  The other seven appointees must be 
officials of various departments and agencies of the federal 
government, including at least one from the Armed Forces.  Thirty 
governors are selected by the local chapters, and twelve are 
selected by the Board as members-at-large.  Id. 
 An annual financial statement must be submitted to the 
Secretary of Defense, who audits the report at the expense of the 
Red Cross and forwards it to Congress.  Id. §§ 6-7.  The federal 
government furnishes a building in Washington, D.C. for the 
organization's headquarters which, however, is responsible for 
maintenance.  Id. § 13.  
 Commissioned officers of the Army, Navy and Air Force 
may be detailed for duty with the Red Cross.  10 U.S.C. § 711a.  
It is given the privilege of purchasing supplies from the Armed 
Forces, id. §§ 4624-4625, 9624-9625, borrowing certain equipment, 
id. § 2542, and using government buildings for storing supplies.  
Id. § 2670.  Red Cross employees, in some circumstances, may be 
furnished meals and quarters while on duty serving the Armed 
Forces.  However, in this connection, "employees of the American 
National Red Cross may not be considered as employees of the 
United States."  Id. § 2602.    
 The independence of the Red Cross is demonstrated in 
that its employees are not federal employees, its activities are 
supported primarily by private sources,5 and its day-to-day 
                     
5
.  The Red Cross blood collection service, which is not  
  
activities are directed by the organization itself, not the 
government.   
 The charter also provides that the Red Cross has "the 
power to sue and be sued in courts of law and equity, State or 
Federal, within the jurisdiction of the United States."  36 
U.S.C. § 2.  In American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465 
(1992), the Supreme Court held that this provision authorized the 
Red Cross to remove actions pending against it in state court to 
federal district court, and that provides the jurisdictional 
basis in the case before us.   
 The Supreme Court has also held that the Red Cross is 
not subject to state taxation.  In Department of Employment v. 
United States, 385 U.S. 355, 359-360 (1966), the opinion referred 
to the Red Cross as "virtually . . . an arm of the government," 
but pointed out: 
 "In those respects in which the Red Cross 
differs from the usual government agency -- 
e.g., in that its employees are not employees 
(..continued) 
mentioned in its charter, provides an important part of its 
revenues.  In 1985, blood services provided 60.5% of the Red 
Cross' total revenues.  Annual Report of the American Red Cross 
for 1985.  In the most recent statement, "biomedial services" 
provided 77% of revenues.  Annual Financial Report for 1993-1994.  
Interestingly, 62% of Red Cross' expenses were devoted to 
providing blood services, while only 5% were attributed to 
providing services to the Armed Forces.  Id.    
 
    American Red Cross' blood services division maintains 
financial and managerial independence from its divisions which 
perform chartered activities, and generates significant "excess 
revenues."  Doe v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 845 F. Supp. 1152, 
1153 n.4 (S.D.W.V. 1994). 
  
of the United States, and that government 
officials do not direct its everyday affairs 
-- the Red Cross is like other institutions  
 -- e.g., national banks -- whose status as 
tax-immune instrumentalities of the United 
States is beyond dispute." 
Id. at 160; see also Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U.S. 229, 
235 (1935) ("Immunity of corporate government agencies from suit 
and judicial process . . . is less readily implied than immunity 
from taxation"); United States v. City of Spokane, 918 F.2d 84, 
87-88 (9th Cir. 1990).   
 Irwin held that, although referred to in the tax cases 
as "an agency" or "instrumentality," the Red Cross is not "an 
agency" of the federal government for purposes of the Freedom of 
Information Act.  That statute defines "agency" as including, 
among others, a "Government corporation" and a "Government 
controlled corporation."  5 U.S.C. § 552(f).  Finding that the 
structure, activities and purposes of the Red Cross demonstrated 
that the organization was not subject to substantial federal 
control or supervision, Irwin held that it was not "an agency."  
The Court also noted legislative history that referred to such 
entities as the Tennessee Valley Authority and Amtrak as 
governmental units to be covered by the Freedom of Information 
Act.  640 F.2d at 1054. 
 The status of a federal "agency" or "instrumentality" 
as it might affect its amenability to a jury trial on a tort 
claim has received little appellate consideration.  In Young v. 
  
United States Postal Serv., 869 F.2d 158, 159 (2d Cir. 1989) (per 
curiam), the Court of Appeals held that the "sue and be sued" 
clause in the Postal Service charter did not expose it to a jury 
trial on an employee's claim of wrongful discharge.   
 The Young Court noted that the "sue and be sued" clause 
waived the sovereign immunity of the Postal Service to the extent 
that prejudgment interest could be recovered in a Title VII 
action against it.  Id. (citing Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549 
(1988)).  The Court also observed that some federal agencies are 
subject to liability for costs, garnishment and attachment 
proceedings.  Id. (citing Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. J.G. 
Menihan Corp., 312 U.S. 81 (1941); Federal Housing Admin., Region 
No. 4 v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242 (1940)).  Nevertheless, Young 
decided, "the party being sued is still the federal government," 
and the Postal Service charter did not contain language granting 
a jury trial.  Id. at 159.  Although not mentioned in Young, it 
is of some relevance that the Postal Service charter makes it 
subject to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 26 U.S.C. § 2680, which 
does not permit jury trials of personal injury claims.   
 In Hanna v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n of S. Ill., 903 
F.2d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir. 1990), the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit found that a plaintiff was entitled to a jury 
trial in an age discrimination suit against entities having less 
ties with the government than does the Postal Service.  The 
defendants, Production Credit Associations and Federal Land Bank 
Associations, were "federally chartered instrumentalit[ies] of 
the United States," and had been given the power to "sue and be 
  
sued."  12 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2073, 2091, 2093.   The Hanna Court 
found that the defendants were not "federal agencies per se" 
because Congress' intention was that the land banks and credit 
associations were to be owned and operated by farmers rather than 
the federal government.  Hanna, 903 F.2d at 1162.  Therefore, the 
defendants were "private employers without sufficient 
governmental involvement to constitute federal agencies exempt 
from jury trials."  Id.  It is worthy of note that land banks are 
immune from state and local taxes.  Federal Land Bank v. Board of 
County Comm'rs, 368 U.S. 146 (1961). 
 It may be seen that decisional law establishes that the 
"sue and be sued" clause, without more, does not resolve the 
question before us.   
 In many of the opinions discussing the status of 
agencies or instrumentalities, the courts, by implication, extend 
the shield of sovereign immunity of the government itself to 
insulate some of the entities it created.  It may, however, be 
more realistic to approach the issue by inquiring into the 
attributes of sovereign immunity that Congress affirmatively 
intended to grant "instrumentalities" and "federally chartered 
corporations" when it created those entities.  See Reconstruction 
Fin. Corp. v. J.G. Menihan Corp.  312 U.S. 81, 84 (1941). 
 In FDIC v. Meyer, 114 S. Ct. 996 (1994), the Supreme 
Court held that agencies authorized to "sue and be sued" are 
presumed to have fully waived sovereign immunity absent a  
 "clea[r] show[ing] that certain types of 
suits are not consistent with the statutory 
  
or constitutional scheme, that an implied 
restriction of the general authority is 
necessary to avoid grave interference with 
the performance of a governmental function, 
or that for other reasons it was plainly the  
purpose of Congress to use the `sue and be 
sued' clause in a narrow sense." 
Id. at 1003 (internal quotation omitted).   
 An example of a narrow usage of the "sue and be sued" 
clause is in the statute creating the Postal Service.  Clearly, 
the Service retained some of the attributes it held earlier as an 
undoubted part of government.  The ban against jury trials of 
personal injury suits is such an instance.  By contrast, the 
statute creating the land bank system established new entities 
rather than altering the status of a former government 
organization.  That statute reflected no intent to give the 
government control over day-to-day operations.   
 In FHA v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940), the Court 
held that "the words `sue and be sued' in their normal 
connotation embrace all civil process incident to the 
commencement or continuance of legal proceedings."  In Loeffler 
v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549 (1988), the Court described the clause as 
including "the natural and appropriate incidents of legal 
proceedings."  Id. at 555 (quoting Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 312 
U.S. at 85).  Such "incidents" as garnishment and execution 
(Burr), prejudgment interest (Loeffler), costs (Menihan), and 
civil penalties (Commonwealth of Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. 
  
United States Postal Service, 13 F.3d 62 (3d Cir. 1993)), have 
been found applicable in actions against federally created 
entities.   
 Those "incidents," however, differ in kind and quality 
with entitlement to a jury trial and it does not follow that the 
method of trial is necessarily included within the scope of the 
"sue and be sued" clause.  A nonjury trial, after all, does 
provide civil process to resolve disputes and provides the 
additional remedies of garnishment, prejudgment interest and 
costs.  Moreover, the fear has often been expressed that juries 
would award excessive sums against the Government, a factor 
absent from the other "incidents" that have been found to be 
encompassed by the "sue and be sued" clause. 
 The role of the organization and the extent to which it 
carries out purely governmental activity have some relevance.  
Those circumstances can be significant in determining whether 
jury trials would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme, or 
would gravely interfere with the performance of a governmental 
function.  
 Federally chartered corporations vary widely in the 
degree to which they assume basic governmental tasks.  Charters 
that include "sue and be sued" clauses and that require annual 
reports to Congress have been granted to such diverse 
organizations as the Boy Scouts of America, the American Legion, 
Ladies of the Grand Army of the Republic, the National Safety 
Council, and The Foundation of the Federal Bar Association.   
  
Although such organizations undoubtedly have worthy objectives, 
they would not seem to require sovereign immunity.   
 The Red Cross is not given wholesale governmental 
immunity simply by virtue of its federal charter.  But a relevant 
inquiry is whether, despite the lack of specific references to 
jury trials in its charter, the Red Cross is so deeply involved 
in the government that a prohibition may be implied as if the 
United States itself were the party.  In our view, such a 
relationship does not exist. 
 The Red Cross sometimes works in a context in which it 
seems to be almost "an arm of the government."  Nevertheless, the 
federal government does not manage the day-to-day activities of 
the organization, does not provide the funds to support its 
activities, and does not employ or grant civil service benefits 
to its workers.  In addition, to properly fulfill its role as one 
of the participants in international Red Cross activities and to 
enforce the provisions of the Geneva Convention, the Red Cross 
must be independent of the United States government.  In weighing 
all of these factors and considering analogous decisional law, we 
are persuaded that the American Red Cross does not share 
sovereign immunity with the United States such that jury trials 
in personal injury suits would be inconsistent with, or interfere 
with, the role outlined in the organization's charter.6   
                     
6
.  One district court remarked, "ARC has elected to participate 
and compete with private corporations in the blood services 
industry . . . [and] [a]s a full-fledged industry participant  
. . .  should be subject to jury trial . . . ."  Doe, 845 F. 
Supp. at 1153 n.4 (S.D. W.V. 1994). 
  
Accordingly, we hold that parties in litigation of this nature 
against the Red Cross are entitled to a trial by jury.   
 III. 
 Having concluded that the Red Cross' status is no bar, 
we must consider whether plaintiff waived her rights because she 
did not specifically request a jury trial.  As noted earlier, the 
plaintiff's complaint in state court requested a nonjury trial,7 
but the hospital and doctors defendants did demand a jury.   
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(c) provides that, in 
cases removed to the district court, a party who made a demand 
for a jury trial in accordance with state law need not repeat the 
request after removal.  The Rule further provides:  
 "If state law applicable in the court from 
which the case is removed does not require 
the parties to make express demands in order 
to claim trial by jury, they need not make 
demands after removal unless the court 
directs that they do so . . . ." 
 Plaintiff's position is that under Pennsylvania law, if 
any party requests a jury trial, all other parties may rely upon 
that demand.  A request for jury trial may not be withdrawn 
without the consent of all parties who have appeared in the 
                     
7
.  Plaintiff's counsel assertedly did so in order to escape 
paying a jury fee, in the expectation that the defendant hospital 
would -- as it did -- ask for a jury trial.  Such a practice 
borders on "gamesmanship" that might expose a lawyer to severe 
criticism if it were important that a plaintiff receive a jury 
trial. 
  
action.  Pa. R. Civ. P. 1007.1(c).  "[T]he Rule apparently seeks 
to protect the rights of those parties who did not make the 
demand for jury trial . . . ."  McFarlane v. Hickman, 492 A.2d 
740, 743 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).  See also Recht v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 545 A.2d 450, 452 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) ("where the 
circumstances indicate the possibility of reliance, any doubts 
should be resolved in favor of allowing a jury trial").   
 At the time of removal, the plaintiff's right to a jury 
trial had been perfected, and appropriately, the case was 
docketed in the district court as a jury case.  Not until 
approximately ten months after removal did the Red Cross file its 
motion to reclassify the case as nonjury.   
 The Red Cross argues that the issues between it and the 
plaintiff differ from those raised in the claims against the 
hospital.  Relying on Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(d) and Rosen v. Dick, 
639 F.2d 82, 91-96 (2d Cir. 1980), the Red Cross contends that 
plaintiff is entitled to rely on a jury trial demand only as to 
the issues between her and the hospital.  However, Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 38(d) applies to cases originally filed in the district court.  
Rule 81(c) governs removal cases, and it carries over the valid 
demand in the state court to the federal proceedings.8   
                     
8
.  We observe also, but find no reason to discuss, the fact that 
co-counsel for plaintiff filed his appearance in the state court 
sometime after the suit was commenced and included on the 
praecipe a demand for a jury trial.  The praecipe apparently was 
filed in the Court of Common Pleas within the time specified in 
Pa. R. Civ. P. 1007.1(a), which provides that a written demand 
for a jury trial may be filed and served not later than twenty 
days after service of the last permissible pleading.  "The demand 
shall be made by endorsement on a pleading or by a separate 
writing."  Id.  The Red Cross contends that plaintiff's co-
  
 We conclude therefore that the district court erred in 
denying the plaintiff the right to a jury trial.  The case must 
therefore be remanded for a new trial. 
 IV. 
 We must also consider whether testimony and discovery 
of a blood donor is subject to privilege.  A substantial amount 
of case law has been developed over whether such discovery should 
be permitted.  Courts have weighed potential adverse effects to 
the blood collection system and donors' privacy interests against 
the necessity of such testimony to recovery by victims of 
contaminated blood.9 
(..continued) 
counsel's appearance was never served.  In addition, there is 
some question whether the demand was otherwise valid inasmuch as 
a praecipe is not considered to be a pleading.  
9
.  See e.g., Watson v. Lowcountry Red Cross, 974 F.2d 482 (4th 
Cir. 1992); Coleman v. American Red Cross, 979 F.2d 1135 (6th 
Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Diabo v. Baystate Medical Ctr., 147 
F.R.D. 6 (D. Mass. 1993); Sampson v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 
139 F.R.D. 95 (N.D. Tex. 1991); Borzillieri v. American Nat'l Red 
Cross, 139 F.R.D. 284 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); Bradway v. American Nat'l 
Red Cross, 132 F.R.D. 78 (N.D. Ga. 1990); Boutte v. Blood Sys., 
Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122 (W.D. La. 1989); Doe v. American Red Cross 
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    See also, Amy K. Johnson, Note, Watson v. Lowcountry Red 
Cross:  The Fourth Circuit Speaks on Discovery Rights in Blood 
Transfusion Litigation, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 2084 (1993); Ann M. 
  
 The case before us is brought under the law of 
Pennsylvania.  Because the Supreme Court of that state has ruled 
on the privacy issue of donors and established a conditional 
privilege, we will follow its lead.  See Fed. R. Evid. 501 (in 
civil actions, where state law supplies the rule of decision as 
to claims or defenses, the privilege of a witness is determined 
by state law); see also Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Federalism and 
Federal Rule of Evidence 501:  Privilege and Vertical Choice of 
Law, 82 Geo. L.J. 1781 (1994).   
 In Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 609 A.2d 796 
(Pa. 1992), the state Supreme Court determined that the 
Pennsylvania Constitution provides a right of privacy that 
includes a right to be left alone, but that is not absolute.  In 
blood contamination cases, that right must be balanced against 
victims' need to establish their claims and against the state's 
interest in preserving the integrity of the volunteer blood 
donation system.  Id. at 802.  The Court determined that the 
proper balancing of the various interests weighed in favor of 
permitting discovery, but on the condition that the identity of 
the donor not be disclosed.  Id. at 803.  Moreover, the court 
decided that its approach was consistent with Pennsylvania's 
(..continued) 
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Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information Act, 35 P.S. §§ 7601-
7612.   
 We will follow the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's 
resolution of the issue and are confident that there is adequate 
flexibility in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to allow 
discovery while still preserving the donor's anonymity.  We also 
agree with the district court's comment that a deposition or 
other discovery in cases of this nature should be conducted under 
judicial supervision.  
 V. 
 Because the case must be retried, we believe it 
appropriate to comment further on the somewhat novel discovery 
issue present here.  It is obvious that discovery from the donor 
who supplied the contaminated blood would provide relevant 
information on the negligence issues in the case.  The state 
court judge, before removal, conferred with the parties and, 
apparently out of concern for privacy interests of the donor, it 
was decided to submit interrogatories to preserve his anonymity.  
Before that approach could be implemented, the case was removed 
to the district court, where the parties again agreed to that 
general procedure.   
 After responses to the interrogatories were received, 
plaintiff moved to compel a discovery deposition of the donor.  
The Red Cross objected, and the district court denied plaintiff's 
motion on the grounds that   
 "(1) request is untimely [filed on the last day set for 
discovery];  
  
 (2) no genuine need has been shown;  
 (3) privacy interests of donor; [and],  
 (4) previous agreement has been adhered to." 
 Discovery matters of this nature are discretionary with 
the trial court and would not ordinarily be the subject of 
discussion on appeal.  However, events at the trial demonstrate 
that the district judge may wish to reconsider his previous 
ruling and permit the parties to take the discovery deposition of 
the donor.    
 After several days of testimony during the bench trial, 
the district judge stated to counsel, "I am increasingly 
persuaded that there is no way to have a really fair and 
objective determination of some of the issues in this case 
without having the testimony of Donor X under oath at some point. 
. . . It seems to me if on no other issue than causation, that is 
a crucial bit of evidence."  The judge, however, believed it 
would be inappropriate to have a discovery deposition at that 
time and that it would be preferable to have the testimony taken 
under judicial supervision.   
 After some further discussion, the lawyers and the 
court agreed that each of the parties would submit questions to 
the judge, who would propound them to the donor in chambers, in 
counsels' presence.  The lawyers were permitted to suggest 
additional questions as the testimony unfolded and would be 
permitted to cross-examine if they perceived a need.  Counsel for 
plaintiff did not suggest additional questions to the judge after 
the initial interrogation, but Red Cross' lawyer did.  However, 
  
plaintiff now asserts that a discovery deposition should have 
been permitted.   
 Circumstances have changed since the initial denial of 
the plaintiff's request for the donor's discovery deposition.  
The testimonial procedure used during the bench trial was no 
doubt adequate for a sophisticated fact-finder like the able and 
experienced district judge to make the crucial findings of 
credibility.  However, this case must now be tried to a jury and 
the parties will be required to reckon with the believability of 
the donor because the critical events occurred more than ten 
years ago.  Moreover, because a human tendency to deny or attempt 
to excuse conduct that created disastrous consequences to a 
victim is not uncommon, a more extensive interrogation probably 
will be necessary.  A wide-ranging discovery deposition most 
likely would be of great assistance to both parties and would 
improve the presentation to be made at trial.   
 In these circumstances, we believe that the trial judge 
should grant the request for a discovery deposition subject to 
judicial supervision -- perhaps in the presence of a magistrate 
judge or the trial judge himself -- but under conditions assuring 
the donor anonymity and placing transcripts under seal if that 
appears to be necessary.  We see no reason why the donor could 
not be called to testify at trial under appropriate conditions.10 
                     
10
.  It occurs to us that it would be possible to protect the 
donor's anonymity at trial by displaying his photograph to the 
panel from which the jury will ultimately be selected.  Before 
the usual voir dire questioning began and before the nature of 
the case was disclosed, the venire would be asked, without any 
reference to the donor's name or role, if any of them recognized 
  
 VI. 
 The judgment of the district court will be reversed, 
and the case will be remanded for a new trial. 
(..continued) 
the individual.  This procedure would probably prevent the 
unlikely, but possible, situation where the trial might have 
proceeded for some time before a juror might recognize the donor 
when he is called to testify.  This is merely a suggestion and we 
do not wish to limit the trial court's use of other measures that 
may be appropriate.   
